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Extended Deterrence, Compellence and
the "Old World Order"

John Arquilla, Paul K. Davis

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the "Old World Order"**

John Arquilla, Paul K. Davis

**Prepared for the
Joint Staff**

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PREFACE

This Note is the companion piece to earlier work, which first described a methodology for analyzing and gaming opponent reasoning and then reported on its employment during and after the recent conflict with Iraq. The focus here is on additional testing, via historical case studies, of the theoretical models of behavior in order to determine whether or not they possess a robust, general validity. The overall goal is to improve U.S. strategies in crisis and conflict. Therefore, the historical analyses that follow are structured, beyond their simple testing function, to generate policy-relevant conclusions for senior political and military leaders.

This study, which forms part of a larger analysis of defense planning for the post-Cold War era, has been supported by the Joint Staff. It is being conducted in the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The authors welcome comments.

SUMMARY

In earlier work (Davis and Arquilla, 1991a, 1991b), a general theory of aggressor reasoning was developed and then applied to a crisis in progress. Multiple models of decisionmakers, assumed to be constrained by "limited rationality," were employed; aggressors were categorized either as cautious "incrementalists" (Model One) or as visionary, goal-seeking "conquerors" (Model Two). This Note, which forms the final part of a research "trilogy," endeavors to demonstrate the enduring, general validity of the methodology and to explain nettlesome deterrence failures. Thus, in examining several crises, the key decisionmakers of the precipitating sides are tested for their "limited rationality" and for their incrementalist or more goal-driven approach to risk taking. Also, the policy implications of these case studies are identified, at both the broad strategic and the "crisis-specific" levels of analysis. Finally, some evaluation of the relative effectiveness of the military and economic tools of political coercion is made.

Four crises, in which either American or British interests were threatened, are analyzed. Given their insular, primarily maritime natures, both the United States and Britain have long been the predominant practitioners of the art of protecting their vital interests from a distance. Between them, according to one historical study (Huth and Russett, 1988), they have had to cope with nearly half of *all* the threats posed by aggressors against small states that have needed to rely on outside protectors. The workhorse of their policies has been the strategy of extended deterrence, the effort to prevent others' attacks on friendly or allied states.

In the defender's areas of interest around the world, extended deterrence is constantly maintained in a general or "covering" way, and its aim is to discourage even the rise of threats. The Carter Doctrine, for example, has set the tone for warning off aggressors from trying their luck in the Persian Gulf. (In 1980, the doctrine was aimed primarily, though not exclusively, at the Soviet Union.) When threats do materialize, however, extended deterrence must shift to an "immediate" mode in order to have the best chance of preventing aggression. In the Gulf example, it is not clear that the shift to a more immediate deterrent strategy occurred when Iraq was threatening Kuwait during the summer of 1990. The disjunction between the theory and practice of extended deterrence—and the Gulf example implies that there is one—is explored in each of the cases surveyed in this study.

To do the "toughest" testing of the theory of limited rationality, the four cases chosen for study are those that may be considered to have been the "least likely" to witness the

failure of deterrence and the onset of aggression. In each of them, the "distant defender" (the United States in three cases, Britain in the fourth) enjoyed tremendous superiority in economic and military power over its opponent. Nevertheless, deterrence failed in every case, as did compellence in all but one instance, to achieve "rollback" by peaceful though coercive means. Also, in each case the opposing state was clearly headed by an undisputed political/military leader, whose character and motivations were the subject of intense scrutiny during, and frequently before, the eruption of crisis.

The cases chosen for study are Colombia's effort to conquer newly independent Panama (1903), Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935), North Korea's attack on the South (1950), and China's gravest threats against Quemoy and Matsu (1958). Benito Mussolini, Kim Il Sung, and Mao Zedong come quickly to mind as the personal opponents to be modeled. In the Colombian case, it was Jose Manuel Marroquin who faced off against Theodore Roosevelt. Although deterrence failed in each case, forceful American measures succeeded in defending Panama, South Korea, and Quemoy and Matsu. In the Ethiopian case, Britain's strategy emphasized the political and economic aspects of coercion. An international coalition, formed under the auspices of the League of Nations, excoriated Italy for its aggression. Economic sanctions followed. Military action didn't, however, and Mussolini triumphed. This last case is strikingly familiar to the crisis over Kuwait, which allows for some comparative analysis to be undertaken.

Several conclusions may be derived from the examination of these cases, even though they have been narrowly structured and focused on a specific set of questions about opponent reasoning. First, it seems clear that "limited rationality," as the authors have defined the concept in their earlier work, is an apt description of the reasoning process employed on both sides. Aside from the decisionmaking problems caused by time constraints and imperfect information, general psychological (i.e., nonpathological) influences—of which frustration and positive or negative feelings about one's current situation are the most important—are extremely powerful. Also, aggressors routinely underestimate the effects of their opponents' maritime capabilities for blockade, strategic lift, and bombardment, suggesting that a form of "analytic bias" is prevalent.

In each of our four cases, the opponent is a clearly identifiable individual. This makes it possible to test the theory that two fundamental "models" of reasoning are capable of explaining many cases of aggression. One depicts opponents as pragmatic incrementalists (however ruthless they might be). The other posits a more intensely goal-driven visionary. The two models work quite well. Indeed, there is even historical evidence that the United States and Britain strove repeatedly to develop single images of their opponents. In the

Ethiopian case, for example, Mussolini was viewed as an incrementalist, backed by Hitler, who was seen as the ambitious goal-seeker. In fact, it was Mussolini who sought to rebuild a modern Roman Empire and Hitler who, at least in 1935, had far more modest aims in Central Europe. This case clearly affords an opportunity to validate the benefits of employing the two models of behavior as a means of improving analysis. Had Britain and the League of Nations taken Mussolini more seriously, they could have "hedged" their policies to improve the chances for successful compellence.

Another factor that emerges as a powerful spur to action, and a bar to successful deterrence, is the "initiative." The ability to control the timing, scope, and gravity of events and to exit a crisis at will provides an important safety net for an aggressor. If an initial threat prompts a swift or firm reaction, retreat is generally possible. Soviet coercive action and retreat in the Berlin crisis and the placement and later removal of missiles in Cuba are two good examples of the benefits of having a "monopoly on the initiative." In the cases studied herein, each of the aggressors had a high degree of control over the initiative, though it did tend to erode somewhat as the crisis unfolded. This is a natural pattern in that their maritime opponents eventually projected power to the area of the crisis and overcame the hurly-burly of their democratic processes, which generally act as a drag on action.

The significance to aggressors of having "sponsors" is also evident in these four case studies. Save in the Panama crisis of 1903, each attacker came, to some extent, under the direct or indirect protection and influence of a great power hostile to the defenders. Italy was encouraged by Nazi Germany, concern over whose aims had a virtually paralyzing effect on the response to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. North Korea acted, it is thought, with the encouragement of the Soviet Union, and it was ultimately kept from utter defeat by Chinese intervention. In the Quemoy crisis of 1958, what is notable is the lack of overt Soviet support for aggression, which may have played a role in China's decision to terminate its overt threats and military actions. It is important to observe, though, that the issue of sponsorship is generally limited in scope to smaller powers that think about challenging the interests of larger and more powerful states.

The policy implications derived from the findings of these case studies are straightforward. First and foremost, American decisionmakers and their staff organizations must habituate themselves, perhaps even by gaming at high levels, to the practice of carrying along multiple models of opponent reasoning. This way, the unlikely but possible—as well as the probable—contingency may be identified and hedged against.

If opponents are rational in only a very limited way, or do not understand the nature of America's distant but devastating military capabilities, we must compensate by giving

unambiguous political and military warning in the face of looming crisis. This may require, at the political level, that we enter into bilateral or multilateral treaties with friendly nations in areas of vital interest to the United States. In terms of military capabilities, the policy prescription is less clear. While ongoing deployment of troops to areas of enduring vital interest (as in Western Europe and South Korea) clearly maximizes the chances for deterrence success, routine use of this method could lead to strategic overextension. In an era of budgetary constraints, in which the American military is being downsized, the risks attending the commitment of substantial forces to far-flung defensive outposts are self-evident. Also, there are some areas (such as Southwest Asia) where, for political and cultural reasons, the U.S. presence must be minimized.

Finally, the case studies indicate that it has been very difficult for practitioners of extended deterrence to shift from a general, "covering" mode to a more active set of responses when faced with the immediate demands of a crisis in progress. It is in this area that the use of multiple models of opponent reasoning may contribute the most effective policy remedies. At a more operational level, credible military options must be made available early in a crisis. They would complement the political and economic levers of deterrence and coercion, achieving a synergy that does not arise when political, economic, and military options are applied in separate, sequential steps.

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1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

As early as 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was first articulated, the United States was practicing a strategy of "extended deterrence,"¹ and it has been doing so ever since, with a very spotty record of success. President Monroe made it clear to all the European powers that any of their efforts to colonize in the Americas would be forcefully opposed. Although making a general pronouncement, Monroe was responding specifically to perceived threats from Moscow and Madrid. Russia was thus tacitly warned to cease its expansion along the northern Pacific coast, while Spain was cautioned against trying to reassert control over its rebellious colonies.²

Unfortunately, America's political "grasp" exceeded its "reach," since it did not possess the military means to enforce the Monroe Doctrine until many decades later. Indeed, Spain's failure to reconquer its holdings was due largely to British opposition: Madrid was in no position to defy the Royal Navy. Nor was the United States, and British territorial acquisition in South and Central America, and especially in the Caribbean, proceeded apace in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. Even France got away with installing a puppet regime in Mexico, at least until the end of the American Civil War. In the latter part of the 19th century, the United States finished its own continental expansion and honed the navy that had been developed to blockade the Confederacy. By 1890, the American frontier was declared closed, and the United States had begun to look outward. The war with Spain in 1898 brought overseas holdings, as far distant as the Philippines, and the United States thereafter would have ever-increasing, ever more far-flung interests. It would continue to rely on a strategy of extended deterrence of aggression, but even though military muscle had finally caught up with political aims, the strategy would, and still does, frequently fail. Throughout the 20th century, from Colombia's 1903 invasion of Panama to attacks by Japan (1941), North Korea (1950), Vietnam (1965), and Iraq (1990) on American interests, U.S. deterrent efforts have consistently failed against states far inferior to it in capabilities and resources.³

¹Huth and Russett (1988:496) define this simply as "deterrence of an attack on another party."

²See Pratt (1961:168-172).

³The record against more powerful opponents is just as bad. In the 20th century, deterrence failures occurred in crises with Germany (1917), over unrestricted submarine warfare; China (1950, 1954, 1958), over Korea and Quemoy-Matsu; and the USSR (1979), over its invasion of Afghanistan

The objective of this study is to explain the frequent failures of extended deterrence efforts and to analyze the reasoning of opponents in various crises. This builds on earlier work (Davis and Arquilla, 1991a, 1991b) that developed, respectively, a general theory of opponent behavior and then its specific application to the Kuwait crisis of 1990. The present effort seeks to establish, over a number of historical cases, the general validity of the theory of "limited rationality."⁴ Hypotheses drawn from other theories—of general behavioral influences and of "analytic bias"—will also be tested. The importance of third-party "sponsorship" for aggression, or the lack thereof, will also be analyzed. Finally, the study generates some conclusions about what it takes to deter or coerce opponents in crisis and discusses the implications for political policy and defense planning.

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

Each of the next four sections examines a different 20th-century crisis in which both extended deterrence and compellence failed. The cases have been selected for their being "least likely." That is, given the correlation of forces between the aggressor and the primary "protector" (the United States in three instances, Britain in the fourth), no attacker could have viewed its prospects with confidence. Yet all attacked, and one was able to make off with its ill-gotten gains. Two pre-World War II cases are examined, beginning with Colombia's effort to conquer the Isthmus of Panama (1903) and moving on to Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia (1935). These cases are followed by two Cold War crises, covering the invasion of South Korea (1950) and China's bombardment and blockade of Quemoy (1958).

These four cases are just a small proportion of this century's total number of extended deterrence crises,⁵ and are not intended as a representative cross-sampling. Instead, they have been selected for their idiosyncratic, but very significant, attributes. In addition to being cases in which deterrence fails despite the massive relative power deficiency of the aggressor, all four are instances of maritime powers trying to protect distant but still significant national interests. The United States and Britain still fall into this category,

(this last a failure of general extended deterrence). However, one must also consider the possibility that general extended deterrence often worked, in the main, but that successes are hard to detect, as no overt threat or attack arose. Problems with proving deterrence successes of this sort are virtually insurmountable, like trying to prove that the threat of capital punishment has deterred criminals. The key point here, though, is that both weak and powerful opponents have challenged general deterrence, and have nearly always been unmoved by American immediate deterrent threats.

⁴This form of rationality is not only subject to "satisficing" pressures, due to informational and time constraints, but also posits some forms of cognitive failures and susceptibility to general psychological influences that affect risk-taking propensities. Davis and Arquilla (1991a) defines this more fully.

⁵Huth (1988) identifies 52 20th-century cases.

which has accounted for most extended deterrence efforts over the past 100 years.⁶ In most of the total number of cases, the aggressor state is headed by an undisputed individual leader.⁷ There are, however, some significant instances of aggression by more bureaucratically led states (such as Japan in 1941 and Argentina in 1982), which fall outside the purview of this study's tests and were thus excluded. Also excluded were civil wars that had elements of or evolved into interstate wars, as it is hard to analyze identifiable opponent reasoning during the somewhat amorphous early stages of dispute. Hence the Vietnamese case is not covered.⁸

Since each of the crises examined for this study has received considerable scrutiny from historians, some more than others, it is not the intention here to present comprehensive factual descriptions of events. Instead, each case study begins with a brief, "consensus" view of the crisis. Thereafter, the crisis is examined by means of hypothesis testing of the key formulations regarding opponent behavior that were developed in the related earlier studies (Davis and Arquilla, 1991a, 1991b). The same questions are asked of each case, providing the opportunity for "structured focused comparison."⁹ As the outcomes observed (deterrence failures) are all the same, it is appropriate to employ John Stuart Mill's Method of Agreement as an analytic tool: briefly, it contends that, among similar outcomes across cases, if an explanatory variable is present in some but not all instances, then that variable cannot have a causal relationship to the outcome.

Five broad hypotheses are tested in each case. The first is that it should be possible to classify the aggressor within either the "incrementalist" or "conqueror" model of behavior.¹⁰ Each model should also demonstrate sufficient consistency (i.e., relation of means to ends and ordering of preferences, choosing good over bad options as related to outcomes) to reflect a state of "limited rationality." This hypothesis will be tested largely by means of decision analyses, made at key points during each crisis. Related to the issue of limited rationality, but less psychologically driven, is the notion of whether or not the aggressors are properly calculating the power potential of their maritime opponents. Therefore, the hypothesis that "analytic bias" prevents these aggressors from correctly weighing the opposing balance is

⁶Ibid., pp. 24-25, shows the United States or Britain in this role in 28 instances. Six other cases of "distant" deterrence are also analyzed, from Germany's efforts on behalf of Morocco in 1911, to France's support of Chad in the 1980s.

⁷Bueno de Mesquita (1981) analyzes the concept of the individual leader or "gatekeeper."

⁸Given the rise of hypernationalism in recent years, with its potential for inciting civil war and outside intervention, reanalysis of the civil and interstate aspects of the long conflict in Vietnam may prove most fruitful.

⁹A method of historical analysis developed in George and Smoke (1974).

¹⁰Details of which are the subject of Davis and Arquilla (1991a).

tested. In addition to the psychological and cognitive influences on the willingness to take risks, it is also hypothesized that an aggressor's ability to "control the initiative" in crisis is a powerful spur to action. The relationship is assumed to be positive: the greater the control, the more likely the willingness to employ forceful means to achieve desired ends. Having the initiative gives an aggressor control over the timing, location, and gravity of events. It also implies an ability to exit a crisis at will. This may be an absolute attribute of the initiative at the outset of a crisis, but it may tend to erode over time. Saddam Hussein, for example, had tremendous command of the initiative at the outset of the crisis he precipitated. He chose when and where to attack. In holding out, he enjoyed the ability to close the crisis up until the start of the ground campaign. Nonetheless, as events played out, his control of the initiative was constrained as the allied coalition formed, UN support of military operations to expel him from Kuwait developed, American domestic political hurdles to decisive action were overcome, and maintaining his own prestige came increasingly to be a factor.

The hypotheses just described deal in endogenous (or internally caused) factors. The study also considers an important exogenous influence, that of third-party "sponsorship" of aggression. It is hypothesized that encouragement or ultimate protection provided by such a sponsor creates permissive conditions for acts of aggression. Ironically, a sponsor's silence may also encourage aggressive action, as it removes the potential restraining hand on the crisis initiator. It has been suggested (Davis and Arquilla, 1991b) that the Soviet Union played the role of the "dog that failed to bark" in the Kuwait crisis, removing one more constraint on Iraq's decision to invade. Of course, the Soviet passivity in this crisis may also have removed constraints on U.S. action, suggesting that this factor entails both risks and opportunities.

Finally, each case is analyzed to see whether or not a shift from "general" to "immediate" extended deterrence occurred.¹¹ It is hypothesized that the nature of the warning given to a potential aggressor has a powerful impact on his willingness to proceed, in that it clarifies the probability that the third-party defender will participate. If only a general, or "covering" deterrent regime exists, then aggression is less likely to be inhibited. On the other hand, firm, clear warning should be expected to chasten any party contemplating the use of force. That this is not necessarily so is one of this study's more counterintuitive findings.

¹¹Morgan (1983:11) points out that general deterrence is used between states "to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack." Immediate deterrence refers to a situation where "one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it."

To summarize, the various hypotheses tested in the following case studies posit that conditions which contribute to failures of extended deterrence and compellence arise when:

1. Defenders fail to consider multiple models of the aggressor.
2. Aggressors are capable of only a limited sort of rationality.
3. Aggressors enter crises with control over the initiative.
4. Outside sponsorship, either active or passive, is available.
5. Defenders fail to move from general to immediate deterrence.

As the analysis is structured and focused by these hypotheses, it is important to note that this study is not directed toward producing new historical findings. Nonetheless, viewing these four crises through a different "lens" has resulted in a few new historical insights. For example, the Panama crisis, long considered a deterrence success, was actually a failure; and Korea (1950) and Quemoy (1958), often viewed as failures *to deter* by conscious, open, and direct communications with the aggressor, are clearly seen as failures *of deterrence*, albeit of a general, extended sort. In these respects the ensuing analysis does suggest some new ways to think about these historical cases.

2. THE Isthmus Crisis

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

When Simon Bolivar finally succeeded in breaking off a sizable portion of Spain's Latin American holdings to form his utopian "New Granada," he made sure to include within its territorial confines the Panamanian isthmus. Used for centuries as a transshipment point for treasure and trade, it was seen as a sort of "jewel atop the crown" of his new nation, which encompassed the northern quarter of South America. In 1826, Bolivar called a Latin American Congress, to be held in Panama City, at which he intended to propose that a defensive barrier be constructed across the isthmus to keep the United States out.¹ Delegates from Peru, Central America, and Mexico, leery of Bolivar's autocratic proclivities and themselves admirers of democracy, invited the United States to the meeting. Isolationist sentiments kept the Americans from attending, out of fear of entangling alliances.

The conference went on despite the U.S. snub and the participants' growing fears of Bolivar, resulting in a multilateral treaty of "perpetual union" and an agreement to form an international army and navy. Only New Granada ever ratified the treaty, however, and Bolivar's grand coalition was stillborn. New Granada itself was soon to begin breaking up, with Venezuela and Ecuador forming their own countries. What was left, which included Panama, came to call itself Colombia. After the fall of Bolivar, a constitutional system was developed, based on that of the United States. A modest prosperity was achieved and, in 1881, Ferdinand de Lesseps, creator of the Suez Canal, was offered a concession to repeat his performance, this time across the Isthmus of Panama. His success would ensure Colombia's long-term financial health.

Over the next ten years, however, de Lesseps would be defeated by Panama's pestilential climate. The grand project was suspended when less than half-finished, and de Lesseps would lose both his fortune and his mind. Colombia, which had also invested in the de Lesseps venture and lost heavily, would itself soon be wracked by a ruinous civil war, and Panama would try, from time to time, to remove itself from Colombian rule by force of arms. The isthmus, however, remained Colombia's last chance to retrieve its now faltering fortunes, and it was clung to tenaciously, for the Americans—awakened to the need to

¹Lockey (1920:429-433).

improve their geostrategic position by the naval theorist Alfred T. Mahan—were seriously interested in picking up where de Lesseps had left off.²

Two hurdles had to be crossed by the United States before it could seriously negotiate with Panama about an isthmian canal. First, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 between Britain and the United States had to be superseded. It held that no nation from outside the region should build or retain sole control of a canal. Also, no fortifications or security forces were allowable under the terms of the treaty. When Theodore Roosevelt, one of Mahan's most devoted disciples, became president after McKinley's assassination early in 1900, he immediately put pressure on Britain to ease its position on international ownership of a canal. Fortunately, in addition to his implicit "big stick," Roosevelt offered Britain concessions on a territorial dispute in the Pacific Northwest. The British acquiesced, in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, clearing the first obstacle.³

The second problem had more to do with American domestic politics than international relations. There was a heated debate over just where to build the canal. Southern senators wanted it to be in Nicaragua, which was much closer to their ports than was Panama. Northeastern politicians, from whose ports a canal in Panama would not be appreciably farther, favored Panama, as did President Roosevelt. After much wrangling, Panama won out, and in early 1903 Colombia was offered \$10,000,000 down and \$250,000 annually for the concession.

The Colombian senate rejected the offer flatly and unanimously (24 to 0). Colombia asked for roughly two-and-a-half times what the United States was willing to offer, contending that de Lesseps' work in progress, though abandoned for many years, was still quite valuable. Colombia was also in dire financial straits, as the most recent civil war (1899–1902) had bankrupted the country. The American response to Colombia's rejection was angry, but limited. Though faced with this intransigence in early July, Roosevelt was constrained to wait until Congress returned to session nearly five months later, and he communicated as much to Colombia's President Marroquin.

On November 3, 1903, Panama tried once again to secede from Colombia. This time the United States, which had often assisted Colombia in putting down previous revolts in the isthmus, recognized the provisional government. In the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which was hastily signed, the United States guaranteed to protect Panama's sovereignty.

²Bunau-Varilla (1901, 1920), one of de Lesseps' top aides, who played a pivotal role in persuading the United States to opt for a canal through Panama, has provided extensive first-hand, if biased, accounts. McCullough (1977) is the classic study of the history of the events of these years.

³See Pringle (1931), Pratt (1961), and McCullough (1977).

Colombian seaborne forces were subsequently prevented, by the U.S. Navy, from landing on either the Atlantic or Pacific sides of Panama. For many months, though, the United States failed to provide more than naval support for Panama's defense. When Marroquin learned of this, he put together an expeditionary force of several thousand troops, all battle-hardened veterans of Colombia's civil war. They were instructed to march to Panama, through the jungle of Darién, to effect the reconquest. They set out in early 1904 but turned back due to attrition on the march from malaria and yellow fever.⁴ Deterrence had failed, but other factors had intervened to protect U.S. interests.

Soon thereafter, the United States moved substantial ground forces to Panama. Within the next ten years, the canal was completed and opened on August 15, 1914, two weeks after the outbreak of World War I. Colombia, for its part, made no further attempts to reconquer the isthmus. It refused to recognize Panama as a sovereign country until 1921, when the U.S. Congress voted to pay Colombia \$25,000,000 (without interest), the amount of its 1903 counteroffer to the United States.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND ANALYSIS

Models of Behavior

As one analyzes the general American effort to deter a Colombian reconquest of Panama, it seems clear that President Marroquin's resolve was consistently underestimated throughout the crisis. He was viewed in the United States as an elderly intellectual who could be "bought off." Clearly, he was treated as what has been described as a Model One decisionmaker (see Davis and Arquilla, 1991a). Further, his armed forces drew little respect from the Americans. The minuscule Colombian fleet posed no threat at all to the U.S. Navy, which by 1903 was already the world's second largest.⁵ Nonetheless, Marroquin succeeded in landing a battalion-sized force of his best troops in Panama City, despite the presence of an American warship. And despite the failure of this mission (the commanding officer was persuaded to join the rebels), another force was sent. Finally, this one was turned back by the U.S. Navy. Even then, Marroquin persisted, launching an overland invasion.

The key to Marroquin's behavior may be found in Colombia's state at the time. It was bankrupt, and its only potential source of financial remedy had just seceded.⁶ Clearly,

⁴Graell (1933:272-277) provides an account of the Colombian efforts at reconquest.

⁵Pringle (1931) provides a good account of America's (and Theodore Roosevelt's) view of Colombia's weakness. Modelska and Thompson (1988:344) point out that, in terms of naval construction, the United States was actually outspending even the British by 1903.

⁶Rippy (1931:103-121) gives a good description of Colombia's plight.

Marroquin was in the "domain of losses," making him very risk acceptant. His options in November 1903 were to capitulate, negotiate, or fight. Giving up would have had a catastrophic impact on his country, while fighting offered some chance of success, at least of raising U.S. costs and creating a better negotiating environment. The United States was probably right in its assessment of Marroquin as having very limited aims, consistent with a Model One opponent. However, even a less aggressive incrementalist can be pushed in a crisis to accept substantial risks. Of this the United States seemed blissfully unaware.

Limited Rationality

There is circumstantial evidence that Marroquin had little appreciation of U.S. maritime capabilities. The American blockade of the sea routes to Panama, once effected, was complete. Even so, Colombian forces made two efforts at seaborne landings. Then, in the face of the American ability—and overt threats—to transport large armies to the region to attack Colombia itself, Marroquin persisted in launching an overland invasion. Despite the example from just a few years before of the sealift of large American expeditionary forces to Cuba and Puerto Rico during the 1898 war with Spain, Marroquin was unfazed by these threats. This is only circumstantial evidence, though, that he failed to understand America's real military capabilities. Marroquin may have been just desperate enough to attack even knowing that the Americans might come.

The Initiative

Who controlled the pace and scope of events during this crisis? It seems clear that once Panama had seceded, Marroquin had almost substantial control over when, where, and how to effect a reconquest. His means of reconquest were, however subject to the limits of what could be imposed by American naval power and by the fever-ridden Darién jungle. The United States moved sluggishly but eventually closed off the sea approaches to Panama. Even then, well into 1904, no efforts were made to prepare for defense against an overland invasion. Only when canal workers began to arrive did an American ground presence develop (late in 1904). Until then, Colombia had considerable room for maneuver, which it exercised. In this case, Colombia should be viewed as controlling the initiative almost completely at the outset. It was somewhat constricted by the American blockade, but its freedom of action was terminated only when the American ground presence became so large as to preclude future attempts at overland invasion.

Sponsorship

The Hay-Paunceforte Treaty had effectively given Britain's blessing to the United States to work its will on the isthmus. Colombia had no allies among the great powers and was on unfriendly terms with its neighbors (and former possessions) Venezuela and Ecuador. Despite its political isolation, though, Colombia tried to solve its problems via the use of force. This raises the interesting question of whether or not the absence of powerful allies or sponsors acts as a spur to or brake on forceful action. As has been discussed in the study of Saddam Hussein's aggression (Davis and Arquilla, 1991b), great powers may exert a restraining influence, the absence of which makes aggressive choices easier to elect. What is also clear, though, is that U.S. sponsorship of Panama, of which Colombia was well aware, had little effect on the latter's decision to recoup its losses by attempting the use of force.

From General to Immediate Extended Deterrence

The United States performed lackadaisically in this crisis and won at low cost only through luck. Even though President Roosevelt made clear his intentions to protect Panama, his political warning was not backed up with military preparations. Indeed, the first seaborne Colombian expeditionary force was allowed to land, despite the American naval presence. Later, it took nearly a year before sufficient forces were deployed to repel an overland invasion. The United States had ample intelligence regarding Colombia's intention to reconquer Panama, but it had a hard time believing that Marroquin would really invade. The lesson here is that the United States should have hedged against this possibility by strictly enforcing its blockade and by deploying some ground forces to Panama quickly.

Even though Teddy Roosevelt is known for his policy of "speak softly, but carry a big stick," it seems clear that in this case at least, he reversed this maxim in practice. The United States directed a stream of bellicose statements at Colombia, but deployed only the smallest of "sticks" to the region. Only after Colombia made a number of invasion attempts was a bigger "stick" employed. The Panama crisis was America's first effort at immediate extended deterrence after it had moved out onto the world stage with its victory over Spain in the war of 1898. It may well be that the defense of Panama served as a "framing event" for American statecraft, as the pattern of broad general deterrent policies, largely decoupled from movement to immediate deterrence in the face of threat, is now common. Indeed, it crops up in the other American cases that follow.

3. "NEW ROME" VERSUS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

After the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD, Italy was broken up into a crazy-quilt patchwork of city-states, which engaged for nearly a thousand years in almost uninterrupted internecine strife. But by the late 1400s, France and Spain—newly freed from, respectively, British and Moorish occupation—and Austria emerged as the principal competitors for control of the disunited peninsula. Over the next 50 years only Venice was able to resist their powerful embraces. The rest of Italy was carved up into spheres of influence for the next 300 years.¹

By the early 19th century, though, French and Spanish influence had been very nearly eradicated, the former's retreat a result of its disastrous defeat in the Napoleonic Wars. By the middle of the century, a partially unified Italy, in alliance with a Germany that was also struggling to emerge from a millennium of disunity, was ready to expel Austria from its dominant position in the north. Victory over the Austrians in the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 finally delivered Italy from any foreign occupation and prepared it to move onto the world stage as a great power.

Italy soon joined the race for colonies, with particular emphasis on restoring as much of the old African holdings of the Roman Empire as possible. Aside from traditional interests, the annexation of Tunisia and Libya were seen as appropriate ways of offsetting, respectively, French and Turkish colonial power in the region. Italy even established itself in 1882 in Somaliland on the East African littoral, which first brought it into conflict with the Ethiopian "empire." As Italian expeditions pushed inland, skirmishes with the forces of Emperor Menelek became more frequent. However, the Ethiopian ruler pursued a diplomatic solution with the Italians, partly to secure his rear while having to fight the Sudanese Mahdists. The Treaty of Ucciali (1889) established a peace that gave Ethiopia port access on the Red Sea while allowing further Italian settlements in the East African hinterland.

Peace was short-lived, however. Italian encroachments soon went beyond the limits set in the treaty. Ethiopia found itself with less to fear to the west, as the Mahdists were

¹Dehio (1961:33–41) provides a good analysis of these events.

busily preparing to defend the Sudan against Kitchener's gathering invasion force.² This development freed Menelek to resist Italian advances quite forcefully, leading to his willingness to go to war in 1896. In six months of campaigning, the Italians were routed. At the Battle of Adowa, an Italian-Somalian army of 20,000 was wiped out, with over 6,000 Italians killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. The Treaty of Addis Ababa, signed in October 1896, compelled Italy to withdraw from Ethiopian territory back to Somalia and to recognize the latter's national sovereignty.

Italy neither forgot nor forgave this humiliation. However, it devoted its energies to the conquest and pacification of Libya, as well as to the Allied cause in World War I. Despite its participation on the winning side, Italy was economically devastated by the war, and this created ripe conditions for the rise of Mussolini's fascist dictatorship. From the time he took power in 1922, Mussolini wrapped himself in the images of the Roman Empire,³ including the ancient symbol of magisterial authority, the bundled sticks and axe or "fasces." This became the symbol of his party.

Throughout the 1920s, Italy sought Mediterranean hegemony. It engaged in a massive naval buildup, and it entered alliances with Spain, Hungary, and Austria. The former action was to offset French naval power, while the latter counterbalanced the French-led "Little Entente." But Ethiopia was never far from Mussolini's mind, a key part of his design for mastery of North Africa. In December 1934, Italian and Ethiopian forces clashed at Walwal, in a disputed border area between Somalia and Ethiopia. Rival versions of the incident were reported to the League of Nations, which concluded its arbitration of the matter, rendering no judgment, in September 1935. Mussolini, unhappy with the result, invaded Ethiopia the next month, in spite of clear British warnings that he should forbear the use of force.⁴

The League of Nations showed somewhat more alacrity in responding to the Italian invasion than it had in arranging the Walwal arbitration. Four days after the invasion, the League condemned Italy's action. A month later, economic sanctions were agreed to and applied by 51 members. Italian offensive operations came to a halt in place. However, the League couldn't muster sufficient support to threaten military action, out of fear of driving Mussolini closer to Hitler. When Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936, the League's attention was shifted away from Ethiopia. The Italians promptly resumed their

²Churchill (1898) describes Ethiopia's foreign policy of the time as being on the side of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan expedition, in which Churchill served as a cavalry officer.

³Smith (1976) develops this theme extensively.

⁴See Baer (1967).

invasion and in the next month finished their conquest. Ethiopia, technologically outclassed, bombarded from the air by chemical weapons, had no chance to prevail on its own. And no help was forthcoming.

Italy annexed Ethiopia, Germany consolidated its hold on the Rhineland, and the Berlin-Rome Axis was formed. The League of Nations had failed to deter or coerce Italy, and direct British pressure on Italy had been ineffectual. When one considers the Italians' vulnerability to British naval measures against their long (Mediterranean-Suez-Red Sea) supply lines, the Italian success seems nothing short of astonishing.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND ANALYSIS

Models of Behavior

Britain, which provided the principal opposition to Italian designs during this period, made a very conscious effort from the outset to establish whether or not Mussolini was an "incrementalist" or a "conqueror." The former image was settled on, and maintained, throughout the crisis.⁵ Interestingly, the Royal Navy lobbied hard at the same time to portray Hitler as a conqueror. The Admiralty's point was that since Italy was not a grave threat but Germany was, a naval war with Italy might fatally weaken the Royal Navy for any future conflict with the Germans.⁶

In reality, it appears that Mussolini was the self-described conqueror, aiming at reestablishing Italy's ancient glory.⁷ Hitler, on the other hand, was limited to a set of largely incremental aims at this time, though his longer-term visions were generally viewed with alarm, even inside Germany. He was trying to undo some of the injustices of Versailles, an aim many Britons understood and tended to tolerate.⁸ Had Britain carried along both models of behavior, though, it might have "hedged" successfully in both cases. Although it may have taken direct threats of naval action to secure Italian forbearance, even strong

⁵Churchill (1948:166) recalls that many Britons saw Italy's aims in Ethiopia as analogous to Britain's reconquest of the Sudan, and as an effort by Mussolini to shore up domestic support: "Avenging Adowa meant about as much in Italy as the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine in France. There seemed no way in which Mussolini could more easily or at less risk and cost consolidate his power."

⁶See Marder (1970). Churchill was also convinced that Germany posed the more serious threat to British security. However, he urged strong opposition to Italian expansionism, even by forceful means. He contended that the Italian navy, a quarter of the size of the Royal Navy, could do the latter only minor harm. He also felt that recent polls had shown the British public willing to give forceful military responses their "overwhelming measure of national support" (1948:170, 177).

⁷Smith (1976:69) points out that the Ethiopian conquest was the first step in the encirclement of Egypt and the Sudan. Their conquest was to follow. In World War II, of course, Mussolini did invade Egypt.

⁸See Taylor (1962), and Carr's (1939) classic argument for appeasement.

diplomatic opposition to the Rhineland venture could have reversed German policy, and might even have led to a generals' *putsch* against Hitler.

As things stood, however, a visionary, conqueror Mussolini was simply not going to knuckle under in the face of economic sanctions, where an incrementalist most likely would have. The balance of power was just far too favorable for Italy, vis-à-vis Ethiopia. Where a pragmatist would have avoided almost any chance of a fight with Britain, Mussolini the conqueror, in order to achieve his grander designs, would tolerate this risk. Additionally, Italy stood in the "domain of gains" in 1935, prosperous and strong. Behaviorally, Mussolini should thus have tended toward risk aversion. If he had been an incrementalist, a type that tends to shy away from even moderate risks, he would have had even more incentive to maintain the peace. A visionary, however, is less affected by these general behavioral influences in the domain of gains.⁹

Limited Rationality

There is little evidence that Mussolini misunderstood the nature of British power, which was primarily naval. Mussolini himself appreciated the need for a strong navy and had made expansion of his country's battle fleet a prime objective. On the other hand, Britain sought to deter him by naval means only. British ground operations were neither threatened nor planned for. As the Italian forces already stationed in Somalia were sufficient to effect the conquest, there was little reason for naval-only deterrent forces to have good chances for success. As previously noted, Churchill saw the local balance therefore to be heavily in favor of Italy, minimizing its costs and risks.¹⁰

The Initiative

From the outset to the conclusion of this crisis, Mussolini maintained the initiative. He chose when and where to attack, when to suspend operations, and when to resume them. The League of Nations never moved beyond economic sanctions to compel his withdrawal. There was a striking disjunction between the political-economic and the military levers of coercion that Britain and the League might have employed. Mussolini never had to face the imminent threat of outside military action against Italian forces. Therefore, he had very

⁹See Davis and Arquilla (1991a and 1991b) for discussions of the application of prospect theory to international crises. Basically, the theory suggests that if a national leader is happy with the *status quo*, he will be averse to taking risks. If he is discontented with his current situation, then the propensity to assume greater risks is likely to emerge.

¹⁰See footnote 5. Churchill also observed that though the Royal Navy was four times the size of its Italian counterpart, the latter had numerical superiority in the Mediterranean and Red seas (1948:171).

little reason to give in precipitately under sanctions. He could wait until a time of his own choosing, should sanctions really pinch severely, before suspending or reversing his invasion. This is a significant variation from the situation that complicated Saddam Hussein's reasoning—and started to restrict his ability to close the crisis peacefully—when the UN deadline ran out on January 15, 1991, and forceful measures were imminent.

Third-Party Sponsorship

There can be no doubt that the Royal Navy's concerns about Germany, and the general furor kicked up by the occupation of the Rhineland, severely complicated British decisionmaking. Even though Italy and Germany were not formal allies yet (they would become so a few months after the crisis), Germany was quite sympathetic to the Italian cause. Hitler himself was a great personal admirer of Mussolini, and he did provide encouragement for the invasion.¹¹ However, there is no direct evidence that Berlin and Rome actually coordinated their actions in the spring of 1936. The point here is that opponents of Italy's aggression may well have been self-constrained from more taking more forceful actions out of fear of Germany.¹²

While this case is eerily familiar to the Kuwait crisis in many ways, with regard to sponsorship for aggression it is strikingly different. Where Hitler's Germany was a real "wild card" that Italy might be able to play, Iraq was diplomatically without Soviet support or encouragement from the very outset of its invasion of Kuwait. Where German support of Italy increased throughout the crisis over Ethiopia, the Soviet Union moved ever further away from Iraq. As the Kuwait crisis shows, however, lack of outside sponsorship may also imply lack of outside restraint. Therefore, the "dog that doesn't bark" may be an ill omen as easily as a good one.

The other side of the sponsorship issue, Britain and the League's support of Ethiopia, is much murkier. No one ever threatened Italy that an invasion would be forcefully opposed by some protector (Britain, France, or other League members). Mussolini did a creditable job of maintaining his resolve under the pressure of castigation and sanctions, but he also knew that he would be allowed to take and keep his prize. He could not have reasoned thus if Britain had committed itself to Ethiopia's defense.

¹¹ Shirer (1959:289) notes that on the day after the invasion, throughout the German ministries he visited, there was much rejoicing. As he put it: "Wilhelmstrasse was delighted."

¹² Churchill (1948:186) notes ironically that the "soft line" of opposition to Italy failed on two counts. First, it alienated Italy anyway, driving it to align with Germany. Second, Hitler was "encouraged in [his] aggressive designs" by the League's diffident handling of the Ethiopian crisis.

From General to Immediate Extended Deterrence

It is clear from the historical record that Britain was trying to keep the peace in East Africa, and indeed around the world, by means of general deterrence. The preeminent Royal Navy was supposed to be able to dissuade aggressors from essaying the use of force.

Nonetheless a threat arose, of which the British were well apprised, and little effort was made to move to an immediate variant of extended deterrence. No threat to attack Italy or Italian interests was made. No field army was prepared to help Ethiopia. Only some vague threats of naval blockade were issued, and they were never enacted. As with the Panamanian case, the shift to a more immediate deterrent mode was simply not made.

It is possible to argue that Britain felt Ethiopia an unworthy object upon which to venture its blood and treasure. Indeed, the greater the Italian commitment to East Africa, the more could be lopped off by British blockade in a general war. While these considerations are reasonable, it would have been more consistent for Britain to threaten forceful actions against an Italy that it thought was pursuing incremental gains and that would have been likely to respond to this sort of suasion. Also, this conflict provided an ideal opportunity to strike a preventive, crippling blow against the growing Italian navy. The failure to do so would come back to haunt Britain in World War II, as the Italian navy would complete its development and put up a tremendous fight for control of the Mediterranean just a few years later.¹³

¹³Churchill championed the "hard line" against Mussolini, albeit from the back benches of Parliament. He even authored a warning to Mussolini, sent via the latter's envoy, Count Grandi, which summed up the needless risks Italy was undertaking: "To cast an army of nearly a quarter of a million men . . . upon a barren shore two thousand miles from home, against the good will of the whole world, and without command of the sea . . . is to give hostages to fortune unparalleled in all history" (1948:173).

4. THE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

Although Koreans from the dawn of their history have called their country "The Land of the Morning Calm," most of the last millennium has been anything but serene. Korea has been conquered and reconquered many times, first by the Chinese and then by the Mongols, who sought in the 13th century to use the peninsula as a springboard for an invasion of Japan. Japan itself, which had escaped Mongol conquest, began to look hungrily upon Korea, invading it periodically starting in the early 16th century. By the late 1800s, Korea was the object of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian territorial ambitions. Japan first defeated China, in the 1890s, then Russia, in 1905, achieving a control that it would not relinquish until its defeat in 1945.

The partition of Korea along the 38th parallel is an artifact of the closing days of World War II. It is about as far south as the Soviet forces had driven by the time the United States became concerned about the implications of allowing them to conquer the whole peninsula. The Soviets, who had, in conformance with the obligation they had undertaken at Yalta, campaigned against Japan after Germany's defeat, agreed to halt their southward advance along this line, taking responsibility for obtaining the surrender of Japanese troops to the north of it. The United States had no intention of making it a permanent border, but when the war ended the Soviets refused to leave. They installed Kim Il Sung as leader of a totalitarian "people's republic," which he continues to rule at this writing. The United States established an authoritarian-tinged democratic government, to whose presidency Syngman Rhee was elected in 1948. That same year, Soviet troops were withdrawn from the North. The Americans would leave, save for a small advisory group, by June 1949.

Two countries had been created out of one on this distant battlefield of the burgeoning Cold War. Yet each sought to restore the unity of Korea by force of arms. Kim Il Sung was given tanks and heavy artillery by the Soviets. Rhee's openly stated ambitions for conquering the North were, however, disquieting to the United States, which gave him only small arms and light artillery. This created a substantial imbalance of power on the peninsula, enhancing an environment that seemed permissive of the North's desire to invade the South. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a January 1950 speech omitted South

Korea from the "defensive perimeter" of the United States, any shred of political warning the North may have perceived must have largely dissipated.¹

On June 25, 1950, the better-armed North Korean forces invaded, swiftly conquering most of South Korea, save for a chunk of territory around Pusan. Here, with UN (primarily U.S.) assistance, the tide was stemmed. In September, General MacArthur's amphibious attack at Inchon caught the North unawares, resulting in the complete rout of the invading forces. Unfortunately, the UN pursuit pushed too far north, precipitating Chinese intervention. The counterstroke was thus foiled, and the UN and South Korean forces were pushed back south of the 38th parallel. The war then settled into a positional struggle of attrition, with the Chinese and North Koreans being slowly pushed back. In the summer of 1953, peace was established roughly on the basis of the *status quo ante*. Nearly 40 years later, substantial American ground forces are still deployed in South Korea.²

HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND ANALYSIS

Models of Behavior

How did the United States perceive Kim Il Sung during the year or so before his full-blown invasion of South Korea? Although the imbalance of military power between North and South was growing more evident, and intelligence reports led President Truman to conclude that "the North Koreans were capable of such an attack at any time,"³ the dominant image held by both the CIA and State Department was of an incrementalist. Kim Il Sung might have the capability to invade, but he would instead apply "lesser means" (small-scale raiding and subversion) in his quest for control of the South.⁴ A "conqueror" model was simply discarded in analyzing the situation. Had this been done, there can be no doubt that the likelihood of invasion, and the need to take prompt deterrent action, would have been identified. The possibility that Kim Il Sung was a conqueror had to be carried on throughout the period of the prewar crisis.

From the historical record, it is quite clear that Kim Il Sung was not interested in incremental solutions. Instead, the idea of achieving the rapid conquest of the South dominated his planning from the very beginning. Khrushchev, in his memoirs (1970:368),

¹Cumings (1981) and Merrill (1989) are important studies of the origins of the war. See Acheson (1969) for an account of the "defensive perimeter" speech, which also included the comment that American support for South Korea, under the auspices of the United Nations, would extend to the forceful repulsion of aggressors.

²Hastings (1987) is an excellent recent history of the war.

³Truman (1956:331).

⁴This point of view was championed by Acheson.

notes the North Korean leader's extreme confidence in the outcome of a war, expressed at a personal meeting with him and Stalin: "Kim Il Sung was sure it could be won swiftly . . . then intervention by the USA could be avoided." As for the possibility of just a limited attack, it would have made little sense for Kim to have given the Americans time to come to the rescue of the South. Success, and the prevention of American intervention, were absolutely dependent on swift, full-scale offensive operations.

Like Mussolini in 1935, Kim Il Sung would have to be viewed as being in the "domain of gains." His regime was stable, enjoying firm support from both the USSR and China, and the local correlation of forces was highly favorable to him. While this would put him in a risk-averse mode, it must be noted again that incrementalists are far more sensitive to influences that tend to discourage risk-taking behavior. "Conquerors" are less likely to forebear the use of force simply because they are "sitting on gains."⁵

Limited Rationality

Here again there is circumstantial evidence that America's ability to deliver substantial forces to the region was misunderstood by the aggressor. The invasion of South Korea correlates well with the finding of the major studies of extended deterrence (Huth and Russett, 1984 and 1988, and Huth, 1988) that aggressors are far more concerned with the local rather than the overall balance of forces likely to participate in a crisis. Kim Il Sung had a strong advantage over his immediate foe, though U.S. participation would shift the balance against him.

There is also some indication that he failed to appreciate the strategic mobility conferred by American sea power. As North Korean forces drove south, investing the Pusan perimeter, they left no substantial reserve forces north of the main battle. Thus they failed to plan for the possibility that their enemies would seize the opportunity to effect an "end run" at some point along the extensive coastline of the peninsula. Their omission resulted in an almost immediate, absolute reversal of their battlefield fortunes when MacArthur's forces landed at Inchon.

The Initiative

Kim Il Sung held a "monopoly of the initiative" from 1948, when the Soviets began arming his forces with tanks and heavy artillery (which the United States was *not* supplying to the South), until the American landing at Inchon in September 1950. He was able to choose whether or not to attack, where, and when. After MacArthur's masterstroke had

⁵Davis and Arquilla (1991b, Appendix A) makes this point graphically.

defeated his armies, Kim had no way to control events. The Americans weren't about to accept a political solution while the North Koreans were on the run. Only after Chinese intervention was Kim to regain some semblance of control over events.

The issue of the initiative in this case differs significantly from the prior one. Whereas the response to Mussolini's aggression was limited to political and economic levers of coercion, Kim's invasion was rapidly opposed by American military means as well as political ones. Mussolini was absolutely unintimidated by nonmilitary coercion, keeping his ill-gotten gains. From the outset of the Korean crisis, it was made clear that Kim would not be allowed to keep his. American resolve no doubt had an impact, even after Chinese intervention, on the aggressor's willingness to accept a peace on the basis of a rough *status quo antebellum*. The important point, though, is that in yet another case, there was no prompt means in the locality of the crisis that could have thwarted aggression early on.

Third-Party Sponsorship

Soviet support for North Korea's planned invasion of the South was a necessary condition for deterrence failure in June 1950. First, the Soviets armed Kim Il Sung's forces with tanks and heavy artillery, while the South received only light weapons. This created a severe power imbalance between the North and South; if this had not happened, an invasion simply could not have been undertaken with high hopes for success. The foundation for aggression having thus been laid, Kim then went to Moscow to seek approval for an attack. On the Soviet position at the meeting, Khrushchev reports that "we were inclined to think that . . . intervention by the U.S.A. could be avoided."⁶

U.S. policymakers were convinced, at the time, that Moscow had Kim firmly under its control. Because Moscow was deemed not yet ready to challenge the United States militarily, it was thought that Stalin would sanction only more subversion, or at best a limited offensive. What the United States failed to grasp was that aggression could be handled in a "low risk" fashion, by which the Soviets would avoid direct confrontation.

It is interesting to compare the views of British and American policymakers, in the Ethiopian and Korean crises, on the issue of "sponsorship" for aggression. Where British leaders thought that Mussolini would be emboldened by Nazi backing, American decisionmakers believed, incorrectly, that the Soviets would act to restrain Kim. The theoretical issue is whether, when a third party has a close relationship with a potential aggressor, its input will be context dependent, or if it will always tend to encourage

⁶Khrushchev (1970:368). Merrill (1989) has challenged some aspects of Khrushchev's memoirs but still concedes that they provide "the only inside account of Soviet policy" (p. 23).

aggression. Although the context-dependent answer has much intuitive appeal, it is important to consider the alternate possibility that the simple existence of close ties between a sponsor and a potential aggressor tends to promote the use of force. In this case, Soviet sponsorship of North Korea resulted in Kim Il Sung's ever-increasing threats against the South.

The degree of American sponsorship of South Korea was not at all clear in the summer of 1950. Acheson had put it outside the U.S. defensive perimeter, and only light arms were being provided.⁷ Certainly Kim had reason to doubt the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to the South. Coupled with the likelihood that there were good chances to achieve a military *fait accompli*, the failure of extended deterrence in this case grows much less puzzling.

From General to Immediate Extended Deterrence

Though Dean Acheson was often criticized for not including South Korea in the American "defense perimeter" he outlined in his comments on January 12, 1950, to the National Press Club, his speech does refer to the American desire to maintain a sovereign South Korea. Acheson held, in this same speech, that in the event of an attack against South Korea, the United States would invoke "the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression."⁸

Clearly, the United States was practicing "general" extended deterrence with regard to South Korea. American (and Free World) opposition to aggression was articulated in the hope that threats would not arise. That they did, and that the United States failed to move to a more immediate form of deterrence, is, however common a phenomenon, deeply perplexing.

Strategic warning of North Korean aggression was abundant. The dangerous imbalance of forces had been observed, along with the many minor incursions that were stepped up in the early months of 1950. Yet no steps were taken to warn North Korea against attacking. More important, no military plans were made or measures taken to shore up general deterrence. As was argued earlier in this case study, the United States was convinced of two things: First, Kim Il Sung was committed to the use of "lesser means" to expand his control over South Korea. Second, Kim was thought to be under Soviet control, and the Soviets were thought to be loath to provoke a confrontation with the United States.

⁷Pratt (1961:739) points out that the supply of heavy weapons was eschewed "largely because of Syngman Rhee's unconcealed ambition to conquer the north."

⁸Acheson (1969:357).

The sustained use of the two models of opponent reasoning, one of which posits the possibility that a "conqueror" is operating on the other side of a strategic interaction, would have mitigated the problem of the "tyranny of the best estimate." An understanding that "sponsorship" tends generally to be supportive (even if not overtly) of aggression, coupled with a sensitivity to the aggressor's (and the Soviets') monopoly of the initiative, could have changed American policymakers' minds about potential Soviet encouragement of aggression.

In all three cases examined thus far, there have been consistent problems with movement from general to immediate extended deterrence. These problems are not unlike those associated with movement from warning to response in the effort to avert surprise attacks. The case studies of surprise uniformly demonstrate that abundant data exists for warning to be clear. However, inevitable processing pathologies break down the path to the proper response.⁹ The models of opponent reasoning developed in an earlier study (Davis and Arquilla, 1991a) may offer an opportunity to forge new links between warning and response and to encourage movement from general to immediate extended deterrence. In our final case study, though the former fails, the United States does shift to an immediate mode and is successful in halting aggression early on.

⁹Wohlstetter (1962) remains the classic study of this problem. Betts (1982) poses it in the context of European security.

5. MAO AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

One of the great paradoxes of the United States, it has been said, is that externally, in its relations with other nations, it is quite strong, but simultaneously it is "weak" internally owing to the tremendous influence of interest groups.¹ If one were to look for an example of a state diametrically opposed in composition, one could do no better than point to China. Throughout its rich, long history, China has had highly evolved institutions of government and administration that internally have always wielded great power. Externally, however, China has traditionally been quite weak. Thus it has had great difficulty defending itself against invasion, as demonstrated by its swift defeat at the hands of the Mongols in the 12th century. Even in defeat, though, the "internal" power of China remained, and the Mongols themselves were absorbed by the nation they had conquered.

What worked against the Mongols was of little use when China came face to face with the more virulent threat from the West. By the late 19th century, China's external weakness had resulted in its defeat in several wars, and it was carved up into "spheres of influence." Even Japan, which was rushing to modernize along Western lines, took a chunk out of China. By 1900, the internal strength of the Chinese state was largely dissipated, as indicated by the fact that the Boxer War that year, aimed at expelling foreigners, was inspired by the Chinese people rather than the government. It failed miserably, and de facto partitioning of the state continued.

In 1911 the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown, and a republic was established. As President Wilson commented on this development, China was finally "awakening to a consciousness of its power."² For a variety of reasons, the United States was sympathetic to China's aspirations, and it withdrew from the Six-Power Consortium that had been dominating the country. Unfortunately, American disengagement, which extended even to the point of refusing loans to the new Chinese government, left the republic vulnerable to the attentions of an increasingly aggressive Japan. By 1931, investment had become invasion, and China would fight for its life against Japan for nearly 15 years, until the invader's defeat in 1945.³

¹See Krasner (1978:71).

²Cited in Pratt (1961:450).

³Dulles (1946) and Clubb (1966) offer good accounts of this period.

The end of the Japanese threat brought no peace, though. The two main factions, which had been uneasily allied during the war, now turned on each other, and a vicious civil war ensued that would determine the nature of China's future government. Chiang Kai-Shek, who had been directly allied with the West during the war against Japan, led one faction. He held out the promise of an authoritarian government that might democratize over time. Mao Zedong led the communists. While the United States professed only lukewarm support for Chiang,⁴ and indeed gave him little material aid, Mao was steadfastly backed by Moscow. By the end of 1949, Chiang was driven from the Chinese mainland. The United States was not particularly disturbed by this development and was, at the time, willing to contemplate the fall of Formosa to the communists.

After the invasion of South Korea and the subsequent Chinese intervention in that war, the American position toward Chiang was reevaluated. Suddenly he and his followers became bulwarks against Chinese communist expansionism. Chiang was given financial and material aid, which he used to continue the harassment of the Chinese mainland. Mao eventually retaliated by bombarding the offshore islands, which Chiang's forces had been using as bases. In late 1954 and early 1955, Mao's forces mounted particularly strong threats against the islands, prompting an affirmation of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan. President Eisenhower made it clear that the United States would fight if it had to, and that it would use tactical nuclear weapons. The bombardments from the mainland were halted, and the "limited probe"⁵ of the American defense perimeter was over for the moment.

Sniping back and forth between the mainland and the offshore islands continued, and in the autumn of 1958, Mao mounted another attack, this time primarily against Quemoy. In addition to artillery and aerial bombardment, Quemoy was subjected to a naval blockade. Chiang's forces were unable to break it, and American assistance was requested. After some delay, U.S. naval forces came on the scene, and both blockade and bombardment were eventually ended. Nonetheless, the United States and Communist China had gone to the brink of war before the latter bowed to American compellent measures.

⁴General Joseph Stilwell, whose decades of service in the Far East made his opinion respected, played a large role in the initial U.S. failure to support Chiang, whom the former referred to as "Peanut." Stilwell's low opinion of Chiang's military professionalism, as well as of his probity, is discussed at length in Tuchman (1970).

⁵George and Smoke (1974) classify Mao's actions toward the offshore islands in this way.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND ANALYSIS

Models of Behavior

The American response to mounting threats against Quemoy and Matsu in the summer of 1958 has perhaps been characterized best as "sluggish and cautious."⁶ Very good intelligence had given President Eisenhower "definite word"⁷ of a likely attack some weeks before it actually occurred, making Washington's indifferent response to warning quite perplexing. At least part of the problem in handling the crisis arose from uncertainty about Mao's intentions. While it was possible that he was bent on the immediate conquest of Taiwan, it seemed just as likely that Mao was simply attempting to remove ongoing threats to the Chinese mainland. But in addition to this uncertainty about Mao's intentions, the American response was complicated by its ambiguous commitment to the Quemoy and Matsu island groups and by a reluctance to encourage Chiang's continuing interest in reconquest of the mainland.

While the United States remained open-minded about Mao's possible reasoning and intentions, there was an absolute opposition to "hedging" against the worst possible eventuality. At a news conference just days before the Chinese attack began, President Eisenhower, responding to a question about how he would respond to an attack on Quemoy, said: "You simply cannot make military decisions until the event reaches you."⁸ One must note Eisenhower's professional military background in evaluating this comment. It is interesting also to note the strong similarity to General Powell's unwillingness even to move military units unless they were going to fight.⁹

Once the attack began, the United States adopted an incrementalist approach to understanding Mao. This assessment was due, in part, to Mao's careful tacit signaling that an invasion was not imminent. Even so, when his attacks escalated from shelling to include a naval blockade, the United States did begin to move with alacrity. Two carriers were dispatched to reinforce the Seventh Fleet, which itself began preparing to raise the blockade and interdict any invasion force. Clearly, the alternate image of Mao as a "conqueror" was being carried along, even though the dominant view was that he was more of an incrementalist. That Mao was initially undeterred, but acquiesced to compellent pressures, suggests that there was more of the incrementalist about him.

⁶George and Smoke (1974:377).

⁷Eisenhower (1965:293).

⁸Cited in George and Smoke (1974:379).

⁹See Woodward (1991), Chapter 17.

Limited Rationality

The events of the late summer of 1958 were, to a very great extent, repetitive of the 1954-1955 crisis over the offshore islands. Why did Mao try the same sort of "limited probe" a second time, when his first effort had been rebuffed so easily? One possible reason for his renewed aggression was that the local balance of forces had moved heavily in his favor. Between 1955 and 1958, the People's Republic had built several airfields in the vicinity of the offshore islands, improved its artillery bombardment capabilities, and expanded its navy substantially. Also, substantial ground forces had been moved to the area, now outnumbering the 100,000 or so Nationalist troops on the islands.

If Huth and Russett are right about the importance of the local balance of forces to successful deterrence, there was much reason to be concerned about an attack. America's overall, nonimmediate power resources, being largely naval, simply weren't of the type to encourage successful extended deterrence. That Mao persisted in an endeavor, despite America's complete naval predominance, is a possible testament to his inability to analyze correctly the effects and implications of sea power.

The Initiative

Another factor that may have increased Mao's willingness to attack the offshore islands again was his complete control of the initiative. He could choose when and where to threaten or attack, and if or when to break it off or proceed. Unlike Kim Il Sung, whose initiative dissipated soon after he opted for the use of force, Mao had no need to fear an American attack as an early response to his own aggression. This is not to suggest that he would have retained the option to exit the crisis quietly at any point, only that his control was total at the outset and decreased only slowly. The very fact that he could make the same threats just a few years after his first effort indicates that Mao's initiative in this arena was quite robust.

Third-Party Sponsorship

Yet another reason exists for the renewal of China's efforts to gain control of the offshore islands. The Soviet Union, its principal ally, had radically improved its nuclear balance vis-à-vis the United States during the period 1955-1958. No longer could the United States threaten with impunity to use nuclear weapons against China, as it had in Korea and in the first Taiwan crisis. In fact, the United States made no nuclear threats in the 1958 Quemoy crisis. Under these circumstances, one would expect that China, sheltered to some degree under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, would be able to resume its aggression.

At the same time, the Soviet Union can hardly have been willing to risk its own destruction over the offshore islands. Therefore, it had powerful incentives to monitor the crisis, once begun, in order to keep it from moving out of control. It appears that the Soviets did just this, and that their unwillingness to encourage Chinese intransigence played an important role in the success of American compellent efforts.¹⁰

From General to Immediate Extended Deterrence

Of the four cases of deterrence failure examined in this study, only in the Quemoy crisis was there clear movement from general, or covering, deterrence to direct efforts to dissuade an aggressor from attacking. This is also the only case among the four in which the opponent was halted, by the efforts of the distant defender, before the outbreak of major war. Because the aggressor's aims could be realized only by an amphibious invasion, it should not be surprising that American deterrent and compellent efforts were successful. The U.S. Navy was in a position to destroy any invasion force completely, and it had been tasked with doing just that if an attack occurred.

While the essential maritime element of this crisis (this is the only case in which the attacker *had* to go by sea) made its prospective outcome clear, given American participation, there is at least some evidence that the United States was flexible in its perceptions of Mao's reasoning. Though he was viewed generally as prudently pursuing incremental gains, after he blockaded Quemoy the Americans "hedged" against the possibility that his aims might go well beyond the taking of a few islands. That prompt American action followed is largely a function of the lack of need for the movement and deployment of far-off ground forces. The Chinese could be kept from invading Quemoy, and from blockading it, by naval action alone. In Panama, Ethiopia, and South Korea, naval forces by themselves did not have the inherent ability to prevent attacks; and the favorable balance the aggressor enjoyed in each case was undisturbed, encouraging the use of force.

¹⁰Pollack (1976) explores this possibility.

6. CONCLUSIONS

In each of the preceding four cases, extended deterrence failed to prevent the aggressor's use of force. These failures occurred despite the "distant defender's" clear opposition to the aggressor's aims and despite the aggressor's substantial overall inferiority in capabilities and resources. The explanatory model of opponent reasoning, developed and partially tested in earlier studies (Davis and Arquilla, 1991a and 1991b), was employed in analyzing these historical cases, both to test the model's validity and to improve the understanding of these events. In addition to these ends, it is now also possible to draw policy implications from the results of the hypothesis testing done in these case studies.

FINDINGS

Models of Behavior

Beyond question, it appears that the two broad characterizations of individual behavior among heads of state—either "incremental" or "visionary" (that is, ambitiously and impatiently goal driven)—have been demonstrated to possess considerable explanatory power. In each of the cases, save for Mao, the opponent fell clearly into one category or the other. More important, those attempting to deter aggression consistently tried to apply one particular label to an opponent when evidence suggested that at least one other label could be justified.

The consequences of failing to model the opponent correctly are well demonstrated in the Ethiopian and Korean crises. In each case, visionary "conquerors" were mistakenly classified as incrementalists. Thus, when crisis loomed, the aggressor's response to warning was generally one of indifference. In the Quemoy case, however, the defender's vision of Mao was cloudy enough to allow a shift in policy at an early point, contributing to successful compellence. The value that carrying along multiple models of the opponent adds to the defender's decisionmaking thus appears to be substantial.

Case analysis developed two other important points regarding these models of behavior. The first is that even an incrementalist is capable of aggression under circumstances that would ordinarily be considered extremely risky. The second is that "conquerors" are inclined to the use of force, even when general behavioral influences nudge them toward a risk-averse mode of operation. The first point illustrates the explanatory power of prospect theory, and it is applicable to Marroquin's persistent attempts to conquer the Isthmus of Panama in 1903–1904. Colombia was deeply mired in the "domain of losses,"

with a successful invasion holding out the only hope for a reversal of fortune. The second point demonstrates the limitations of prospect theory.¹ Though Mussolini, Kim, and Mao were all in the "domain of gains," and presumably risk averse, they opted for aggression. While Davis and Arquilla (1991b) have pointed out that visionary conquerors are less susceptible to risk-aversive factors, there are other cognitive (limited rationality) and structural (initiative, sponsors) factors that are highly relevant to the opponent's decision to use force in a crisis.

Limited Rationality

In quantitative studies of extended deterrence (Huth and Russett, 1984, 1988; and Huth, 1988), it has been consistently demonstrated that deterrence is likely to fail if the local balance favors an aggressor, even if the overall balance doesn't. In the four cases analyzed herein, the local balance of forces favored the attacker from the outset in every instance. The overall balance, however, was uniformly in favor of the defending side. The relationship is very strong, suggesting that structural factors, such as the local relative balance of forces, may play a powerful role in deterrence failure.

The aggressor's seeming inability to comprehend the importance of the defender's overall capabilities suggests that there is a flaw in his cognitive processing. This problem has been identified in other work as a form of "analytic bias" (see Arquilla, 1991) that causes the aggressor's power calculations to give undue weight to the types of forces with which he is most familiar. Sealift and airlift capabilities are also discounted significantly. While the evidence amassed in these cases shows some very striking correlations along these lines, none of the four cases provides the kind of "smoking gun" evidence of analytic bias that Saddam Hussein exhibited when he contended publicly that he was "not one to be intimidated by navies."²

The Initiative

Each of the attackers in the four crises analyzed enjoyed a considerable initiative at the outset. In three cases, Panama, Korea, and Quemoy, it dissipated—or was eroded by countermeasures—over varying periods of time. Marroquin was able to keep throwing forces at Panama for nearly a year, until substantial American deployments made such actions ill-advised. Kim Il Sung lost his initiative by failing to achieve a full conquest of the South in the opening campaign in Korea. Mao kept the initiative over several years, though American

¹Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is a seminal article on prospect theory.

²Murphy (1991).

naval action in 1958 took the reins from his hands. No invasion was possible with the United States in command of the straits. Only Mussolini was able to retain the initiative throughout the crisis he precipitated, because the use of force to roll back his invasion of Ethiopia was never threatened.

The importance of the initiative in enabling an aggressor to decide when and where to attack, and to de-escalate when desirable, cannot be stressed too much. It plays a powerful role in encouraging aggression, even by "incrementalists" (witness the case of Marroquin in Panama). That it can be restricted and diminished during the course of crisis is a hopeful sign, but it is crucial to note that such constriction, when it did occur, was the result of the defender's use of military means. Thus the early integration of military threats into the political and economic levers of deterrent policy is a likely recipe for improving deterrence. Indeed, the failure to incorporate forceful threats early on may actually encourage aggression.³

Third-Party Sponsorship

Except for Colombia, which acted alone against Panama, all of the aggressors analyzed in this study enjoyed the direct or indirect support of powerful sponsors. Mussolini's relations with the Nazi regime were most cordial, and Hitler expressed open support of the Italian invasion. After the League of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy and Mussolini halted his attack, Hitler occupied the Rhineland. In the ensuing crisis that this action precipitated, and which only confirmed Britain's worst fears that Germany was the *real* threat, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia was completed without British intervention. In the Korean case, there is considerable evidence that Kim Il Sung actually discussed his plans with Stalin and received Soviet blessing for the invasion. Similarly, it is theorized that improved Russian nuclear capabilities provided a credible enough umbrella for China to resume its attacks on the offshore islands without fear of American nuclear blackmail. But the Soviet influence may also have played a part in closing this crisis, as a lack of support from Moscow for continued attacks is thought to have diminished Mao's appetite for further confrontation.

The other side of the "influence" equation, sponsorship for the intended object of aggression, suggests that attackers are not dissuaded simply by the existence of security guarantees. The Republic of Panama was attacked despite an explicit American treaty

³Despite the correlation between a monopoly of the initiative and the onset of aggression, it must be noted that there is little explicit evidence that those contemplating the use of force calculated their chances for success in this fashion. Nonetheless, the finding of this study is highly suggestive.

commitment to defend it. Ethiopia was invaded even though it fell under the protective cloak of the League of Nations. In the Korean and Quemoy cases, the political commitment was somewhat more ambiguous. However, in each case, American opposition to attempts at conquest was well understood.

From General to Immediate Extended Deterrence

The defenders were practicing a form of general, or "covering," deterrence in the four cases surveyed. When general deterrence failed, however, movement to a more immediate mode of dissuasive operations was, in Panama and Quemoy, very slow. In Ethiopia, immediate deterrence was never employed. In the defense of South Korea, deterrence was left in the dust of a roaring invasion from the North.

It is not hard to understand the temptation aggressors face as they view desirable objects that are protected from a distance by largely unseen and unfelt forces. Part of the problem is that the locus of the defender's power is usually far from the aggressor's target, and substantial costs would be incurred if, say, credibly sized ground forces were deployed to face every serious threat that arose. The last part of the puzzle of breakdown between general and immediate deterrence has to do with the nature of the distant defender. Aside from being far from the scene, he is also generally (always in the cases surveyed here) a democracy. And before a democracy uses force, many institutional and domestic political obstacles must be overcome. As Tocqueville once put it: "It is very hard for a democracy to go to war."

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

The findings of this study suggest that deterring acts of aggression against U.S. interests, and compelling their redress when deterrence fails, are very hard tasks. The United States is an insular power, far removed from many of its vital interests around the world. But even if the problem of extended deterrence is generally intractable, there may be ways to improve its practice, at least at the margins. At the same time, measures that shore up deterrence may also pave the way for more efficient compellent practices.

The Use of Multiple Models of the Opponent

The foregoing cases have uniformly reflected the internal debate over what kind of aggressor was being confronted. In three of the cases, definite positions were taken on the issue, two of which (Mussolini and Kim Il Sung) were wrong. Marroquin was properly viewed as an incrementalist, though the pressures that would drive him to attack anyway were simply not being analyzed by Theodore Roosevelt's decisionmaking team; a clear point

of view was never achieved, and multiple models were, perhaps unknowingly, employed. Only in the Quemoy crisis were American actions consistent with the "multiple model" approach. This led to the only compellence success among the set of crises, as the United States moved promptly to use its military options when China failed to lift its blockade of Quemoy.

American policymakers should move away from single characterizations of opponents, institutionalizing instead a practice of considering the possibility that either an "incrementalist" or a "conqueror," or even some other type of opponent, is working the opposing side of a crisis. This should make "hedging" easier to contemplate and effect, as has been discussed in the study of Saddam Hussein during the Kuwait crisis (Davis and Arquilla, 1991b).

Why not consider all opponents to be conquerors? Surely incrementalists would be deterred by any measure strong enough to stop a more virulent threatener. While this approach would no doubt be more effective than allowing the "tyranny of the best estimate" to rule, it would also create sometimes unnecessary political costs, both domestically and internationally. American leaders would have a hard time convincing the electorate that forceful threats are the proper response in the face of every looming crisis. Even our allies might be disconcerted by actions that precipitate conflict, restricting their own freedom of action and perhaps casting doubt on their own sovereignty. This last point outlines a possible reason for the lack of American military response in the face of Saddam's coercion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. Deployment of American forces to the region in July could well have provoked a counterproductive diplomatic imbroglio that threatened our ties to the friendly Gulf nations.

Integrating Military Operations into the Policy Mix

While there are good reasons to avoid the "tyranny of the worst-case estimate," this should not keep the United States from maintaining the ability to threaten an opponent with the early use of military options. The American grand strategic approach of extended deterrence is supported by political, economic, and military policies. There is no reason that they should be viewed as tools to be employed sequentially. Indeed, there is much evidence to the contrary, that using them in an integrated way produces synergistic effects. Also, the early threat of military action wrests the initiative from the aggressor during the crisis. No longer can he attack in confidence that forceful retaliation is far off in time, an option unusable until after the failure of diplomacy and economic sanctions. Although direct treaty ties with protégés might make early American threats to use force credible, since domestic

political constraints would be diminished, it will still be hard for the United States to maintain favorable local correlations of forces in each area of interest. Deterrence will still have a good chance of failing. That is why, to support a policy of sanctioning the early use of force, defense planners must be tasked with considering the structure necessary to effect a more "active" grand strategic defensive policy. This will maximize the chances for achieving successful compellence (as in the Quemoy crisis of 1958) and, failing in that, the defense of our interests.

Improve Strategic Mobility

The dilemma of American extended deterrence and compellence practice is that the types of forces that have historically contributed to deterrence success (in-place ground forces) take quite a bit of time, money, and political will to deploy. While airlift can move men, and some equipment, heavy material must still go mostly by sea. The naval forces that can be patrolling an area on a continuing basis have greater strategic mobility than ground forces, but they do little to shore up deterrence. Air forces would seem to have the highest degree of strategic mobility, but they are dependent on the possession of secure bases and adequate infrastructure in the protected country. Since there is, and should be, much caution with regard to making long-term deployments of American forces overseas, the deterrence dilemma is, to some degree, intractable. However, some improvements at the margin are possible.

One way to improve strategic mobility is to preposition material in or very near to the protégé country. In this way, airlifted personnel may be quickly married to their equipment in a crisis. Potential problems with this sort of scheme might be that the protégé would insist on some sort of joint controls over the uses of this material, or would have great difficulty in providing adequate security at sites where prepositioned materials and equipment are stored. In this regard, maritime prepositioning may be viewed as preferable to in-country sites. With regard to air forces, since they rotate more easily and swiftly than their ground counterparts, it may be useful to stage their activities so that they are almost always present, to some degree, in the protégé country. A final recommendation is to create a light but mobile force with enhanced antitank capabilities. Its strategic mobility would be vastly greater than that of traditional heavy mechanized forces, and its clearly defensive orientation and mission could tend to avoid destabilizing a crisis in progress.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Bureaucratic Actors

This study and its earlier companion pieces (Davis and Arquilla, 1991a and 1991b) have concentrated upon opponents whose leadership is characterized by having an unambiguous "gatekeeper." Saddam, Marroquin, Mussolini, Kim, and Mao all held the reins of decision quite firmly. Most regional powers have this sort of leadership, and indeed the case may be made that even the superpowers are ultimately governed by an individual. However, bureaucratic decisionmaking does occur in some states, and it should be analyzed in future work.

From an intuitive perspective, one would expect a bureaucratic model to look quite a bit like an incrementalist decisionmaker. Yet there is no logical reason for this to be the case. A bureaucracy should be just as likely to have "visionary" proclivities, and in the states that have a bureaucratic decisionmaking structure, "conquerors" may be seen. The preeminent example is provided by Japan during the years leading up to the Pacific War. Here was a clearly bureaucratic aggressor whose aims were visionary, as the name for their early conquests on the Asian mainland, "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," indicates. On the other hand, the Argentine military bureaucracy that precipitated the South Atlantic War in 1982 seems to have had more incremental motivations (return of national territory, shoring up domestic support by foreign adventure). These are both cases that should be analyzed.

Strategic Interaction and the Opponent's Image of the United States

If the model of reasoning developed in this and previous studies is generally valid, then one should expect that the United States arrives at its decisional outputs by similar means. Some effort should be made, then, to model American reasoning as a product of limited rationality, and to incorporate it into a more two-sided analysis of the strategic interaction in a given crisis. Where this study and its companion pieces have focused largely on the opponent, and an earlier classic (Allison, 1971) has analyzed alternate models of American reasoning, future work should incorporate a balanced view of each contending side.

Implications of Nuclear Proliferation

The policy implications of this study assume that the American grand strategy of extended deterrence—and, when deterrence fails, the rollback of aggression—can be pursued along roughly the same lines on which it has proceeded since the Monroe Doctrine was declared the official American policy in 1823. This robust strategy survived even the

harshest climate of the 40 years of the Cold War, but it may succumb to the perils of proliferation. While one scholar (Waltz, 1981) has held that "more nuclear weapons may be better," in that secure deterrent forces will prevent the outbreak of nuclear threats or war, such proliferation may make the world safer for conventional aggression.

If, for example, a potential aggressor has a secure nuclear arsenal, he may well be encouraged to engage in the conventional use of force in pursuit of his aims. The nuclear weapons provide a "safety net" for aggression in that, even in defeat, they secure the attacker's homeland or ultimate values. For example, assume that Saddam Hussein develops a secure nuclear arsenal, some of which may be delivered by long-range weapons or by freighters carrying oil drums concealing nuclear devices to New York harbor. He might then be able to invade Kuwait again, a limited sort of attack, and announce that he will defend his gains with nuclear weapons. If he can credibly threaten the CONUS, or even American allies or forces deploying to the region, the practice of successful compellence will become highly problematic.

The key point, though, is that the underpinning of extended deterrence will have been struck a mortal blow by nuclear proliferation at the regional level. No longer could the United States plan to muster its forces after an invasion to roll back the aggressor. An Inchon or a Desert Storm might not even be attempted in the face of nuclear retaliatory threats. Instead, the deployment of initial defensive forces capable of denying the attacker's aims from the outset will become necessary. This is the crucial problem facing the United States, and it confronts it right now in its relations with Iraq during the immediate postwar period. Analysis of this problem should consider both the implications of successful proliferation and the possibilities for effective preventive policies.

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